Using a simple downstream duopoly model with vertical relations and downstream R&D, we investigate the effect of non-assertion of patents (NAP) provisions. A monopoly upstream firm decides whether to employ NAP provisions. If it does so, it freely incorporates the R&D outcomes into its inputs. Incorporation improves the efficiency of the downstream firms' production. We have interpreted the introduction of NAP provisions as a source of technology spillover. Using the technologies of two downstream firms is optimal for the upstream firm if and only if the degree of technology spillover is small. In addition, if the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is significant, such technology spillovers erode both the profit of the efficient downstream firm and social welfare. We interpret our result in the context of an actual antitrust case related to this model.
Introduction
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter, "JFTC") decided to conduct a hearing into Microsoft Japan (hereinafter, In the MS case, the main issues were as follows.
1. Whether OEM suppliers were forced to enter into direct contracts containing NAP provisions.
2. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D activities concerning PC/AV technologies before July 31, 2004.
3. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D activities concerning PC/AV technologies even after August 1, 2004. 4 . Whether the NAP provisions would have a negative impact on competition in PC/AV technology trading or PC markets. 5 . Whether the NAP provisions were justified. 6 . Whether a cease and desist order was appropriate.
For the purpose of this paper, we set up a simple theoretical model to examine issues 2 to 4 above and investigate whether the JFTC decision was appropriate. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the NAP provisions that provide incentives for our study and related articles. Section 3 explains the model. Section 4 sets out the main results. Section 5 compares the analytical results with the information described in Section 2. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Motivating case and related articles 2.1 The MS case
The outline of the NAP provisions in Windows OEM sales contracts is as follows (the text is taken from the JFTC decision) If an invention used in the "product" licensed to OEM suppliers based on the license agreement or in the "product" version licensed to OEM suppliers in accordance with the license agreement is also employed in a future product, a replacement-use product or successor product of such a "product," the OEM supplier shall agree that (A) it will not file a lawsuit and (B) it will not initiate action against, prosecute, support, or participate in any kind of judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against Microsoft and its affiliate firms or their licensees in terms of infringement of the "OEM supplier's patent" that might arise in the "immunity period" resulting from production, use, sales, or distribution of the future product, replacement-use product, or successor products.
Content of the NAP provisions
On the surface, this provision appears to be advantageous only for MS, but it may lead to technology leakage. If MS improves its OS technologies using an OEM supplier's R&D outcomes, it may yield positive impacts both for MS and for OEM suppliers, but the possible effects of such technology leakage are not simple. This is because such positive impacts would vary, depending on how they spill out and who would benefit from them. In fact, MS raised the following objection.
It is unreasonable to recognize the NAP provisions as a violation of the Antimonopoly Act for the following reasons.
The NAP provisions are reasonable provisions commonly used by technologyrelated firms, including those in the AV consumer electronics industry, to mitigate risks of patent infringement lawsuits and reduce the costs necessary to mitigate such risks while disseminating new technologies. Because the NAP provisions would, by definition, prevent patent infringement lawsuits, they could potentially reduce corporate willingness to engage in R&D efforts. In principle, if such an abstract possibility is illegal, this is tantamount to recognizing that the NAP provisions are in themselves illegal. However, as mentioned above, they have reasonable objectives. If the JFTC recognizes as illegal the NAP provisions that are widely used in the industry, specific reasons are necessary under competition law to justify this decision. If the JFTC regards the NAP provisions as illegal without specific criteria to justify the illegality of the NAP provisions, our industry, which has been using the NAP provisions, will inevitably become confused.
This will have significantly detrimental effects and seriously confuse legitimate intellectual property licensing practices. In addition, OEM suppliers have also benefited from the NAP provisions over many years because they have engaged in business operations without concern for patent lawsuits. OEM suppliers expect the NAP provisions to apply to themselves and other OEM suppliers. The JFTC's decision to overturn the NAP provisions will destroy such expectations.
Furthermore, the NAP provisions are an important element of the compensation that OEM suppliers provide in return for licenses of the Windows series.
The NAP provisions also serve to maintain OEM suppliers' royalty payments at a low level. For this reason, if the JFTC decision is applied retroactively, it would void the NAP provisions. All OEM suppliers that wish to void the NAP provisions while benefiting from low royalty payments should return such profits to MS. Without such a provision, the JFTC decision would be unjust.
It is obviously necessary to pay due attention to international harmonization when enforcing competition law. MS employs NAP provisions worldwide. Corporations all over the world, including Japanese firms, also use NAP provisions on a global scale. In such situations, the competition authority should avoid problems in applying a legal principle to the same kind of trading practices. Without these NAP provisions, global corporations, including the so-called AV consumer elec-tronics industry, face uncertainty when they plan licensing or trading practices in accordance with applicable legal standards.
As mentioned earlier, this trial was to examine whether the NAP provisions violated the Antimonopoly Act, not to judge their legality. For this reason, the arguments of MS were ruled to be inappropriate. Considering these facts, we analyze the effects of MS' NAP provisions by establishing a simple model to describe the situation detailed above.
Main results and related work
We now describe the model setting and the results in this paper. This article assumes that MS is an upstream firm while OEM suppliers are downstream firms. A monopoly upstream firm supplies an input to two downstream firms. The two downstream firms supply their final products to consumers and engage in cost-reducing R&D. We assume that if the upstream firm employs NAP provisions, it freely incorporates R&D outcomes into its inputs. Incorporation of R&D improves the efficiency of the downstream firms' production.
We interpret the introduction of NAP provisions as a source of technology spillover. The theoretical model yields the following result. Using the technologies of the two downstream firms is optimal for the upstream firm as long as the degree of technology spillover is small.
If the spillover is large, the upstream firm should not introduce NAP provisions from the viewpoint of profit. In addition, if the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is significant, such technology spillover erodes both the profit of the efficient downstream firm and social welfare.
We review several articles related to our paper. A seminal article in the field of research joint venture including spillover effects is that of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). They show that cooperative behavior can play a positive role in oligopoly industries. The positive and normative effects of cooperative R&D are examined by Suzumura (1992) , who finds that, in the presence of sufficiently large R&D spillovers, neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second-best R&D levels. In the absence of spillover effects, however, while the cooperative R&D level remains socially insufficient, the noncooperative level may overshoot the first-and second-best levels of R&D.
Some articles discuss technology investments in oligopoly models with vertical relations. Ishii (2004) extends the model of Suzumura (1992) . He examines the effects of cooperative R&D in two vertically related duopolies, which are two final-good manufacturers and two input suppliers, with horizontal and vertical spillovers. Vertical R&D cartels yield a larger social surplus than noncooperative R&D. If the horizontal spillover rate between the input suppliers is insufficiently high, vertical R&D cartels yield a larger social surplus than horizontal ones. Regarding information firewalls, Milliou (2004) considers the case in which information flows from a downstream nonintegrated firm to the downstream division of a vertically integrated firm via its upstream subsidiary. In a setting where both the integrated and the nonintegrated firms engage in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product market, she shows that the impact of the R&D information flow on innovation, output, and profits is positive for the integrated firm and negative for the nonintegrated firm. These papers do not consider the structures of technology spillover to be exogenously given. 1 The following papers consider market structures in which downstream firms determine the degree of technology spillover, but not vertical market structures. 2 The role of a research joint venture is analyzed by Poyago-Theotoky (1999), who shows that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous, firms never disclose any information when determining the degree of R&D spillover noncooperatively. Gil-Moltó et al. (2005) investigate the effect of technology distance between two firms engaging in cost-reducing R&D investments with technology spillover. 3 In their model, the technology distance is endogenously determined They show that the two firms are noncooperatively interested in using very similar (or the same) R&D technologies in order to obtain a very high degree of spillovers. Milliou (2009) also extends the discussion in Poyago-Theotoky (1999) by changing the timing of the decisions concerning the degree of technology spillover. She shows that even if each firm protects its technology without cost, it sometimes chooses not to protect the outcomes of its R&D 2 Moreover, in our paper, the upstream monopolist determines the degree of technology spillover. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the products of the downstream firms are homogeneous and that the firms compete in quantity. The inverse demand function for the final products is given as:
where p is market price, a is a positive constant, and x k represents the output of downstream firm k (k = 1, 2). Note that we assume a to be large enough to secure an interior solution in equilibrium. The constant marginal cost of downstream firm k is given as:
wherec k is the ex ante marginal cost, e k and e j represent the effort levels of downstream firms k and j, respectively, and γ k represents the degree of R&D spillover from downstream Figure 1 shows the market structure in this model.
[ Figure 1 ]
The decision-making process in this setting is as follows. First, the upstream firm decides the technological source from which it obtains the technology. Second, each downstream firm decides its investment level e k . Third, the upstream firm decides the wholesale price w.
Finally, each downstream firm decides its output x k .
Analysis
We solve the game by backward induction.
In the final stage, given γ k , e k (k = 1, 2), and w, the profit of each downstream firm is as follows:
On the basis of the maximization condition for each downstream firm, the output of each downstream firm is calculated as follows:
The profit function of the upstream firm is given as:
In the third stage, the upstream firm sets the optimal w:
By using the aforementioned calculation result on x k (γ 1 , γ 2 , e 1 , e 2 , w) and w(γ 1 , γ 2 , e 1 , e 2 ), we calculate the investment levels and obtain the following result:
Substituting e k (γ 1 , γ 2 ) (k = 1, 2) into the profit functions of the downstream firms, we have:
The profit of the upstream firm is
The consumer surplus and the social surplus are:
We must compare the profits of the upstream firm in the four cases: (i) γ 1 = γ 2 = 0, (ii) [ Figure 2 ]
Proposition 1 It is optimal for the upstream firm to use the technologies of both downstream firms if and only if γ ≤ 2/5. It is optimal for the upstream firm to do nothing if and only if
The difference between SW (γ, γ) and SW (0, 0) is shown in the following figure (this is the case of ϕ = 3/2).
[ Figure 3 ]
From the viewpoint of the downstream firms, the investment reduction through the technology spillover does not necessarily have a negative impact on their profitability. We now briefly explain the reason for this property. Basically, the downstream firms have incentives to make excessive investments to prevail over their competitors because the competition structure between the downstream firms is strategic substitution. This incentive will be reduced because of the technology leakage determined by the upstream firm. The mitigation of this intensive investment competition has a positive impact on the downstream firms. In particular, it has a more advantageous impact on the inefficient downstream firm with less incentive for R&D. This is because the benefit of cost reduction for a downstream firm is proportional to its quantity supplied, whereas the investment cost does not depend on this quantity as it does in the standard setting of R&D. Anticipating this asymmetry of technological spillover, the efficient firm reduces its R&D investment more than the inefficient firm does. When the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is large, the diminished incentive of the efficient firm for R&D investment decreases its profit.
The upstream firm's decision concerning this technology absorption has two effects: the strategic effect mentioned above, and the direct effect of technology leakage. The former decreases the total quantity supplied but the latter increases it. The latter positive effect is small when the spillover effect is large (γ is large). We briefly explain the reason. The larger the degree of spillover effect, the smaller are the equilibrium effort levels of the downstream firms. The total amount of technology leakage is proportional to the equilibrium effort levels. The two properties imply that the positive effect of a marginal increase in the degree of spillover effect becomes weak as the degree of spillover effect becomes large. Therefore, when the degree of spillover effect is large, the technology spillover caused by the decision of the upstream firm decreases the total quantity supplied by the downstream firms. Anticipating this negative effect, the upstream firm does not absorb technologies from the downstream firms when the degree of spillover effect is large. Note that the decrease in this total quantity supplied also harms consumers.
The effect of technology absorption on the social surplus can be explained by the combina-tion of the abovementioned effects. When the ex ante cost heterogeneity is large, technology absorption by the upstream firm has a negative impact on the efficient firm. When the degree of spillover effect is large, the technology absorption has negative impacts on the upstream firm and consumers. The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows the combination of those two properties.
Interpretation of analytical results
We derive the following results. It is only optimal for the upstream firm (MS) to use technology from both efficient and inefficient downstream firms (OEM suppliers) if the degree of technology spillover is small. If MS may not commit "not to take over technology after investment," it will exploit OEM suppliers' investment efforts. For this reason, if the leakage is large, MS should not introduce NAP provisions in some cases. If the preexisting cost gap is significant, technology leakage will erode the profits of the efficient OEM supplier. We now interpret the result.
The JFTC decision
Arguments by the respondent (MS) (from Section 1) The NAP provisions are reasonable provisions commonly used among technology-related firms, including those in the AV consumer electronics industry, to mitigate risks of patent infringement lawsuits and reduce the cost necessary to mitigate such risks while disseminating new technologies. Because the NAP provisions would, by definition, prevent patent infringement lawsuits, they could potentially reduce corporate willingness to engage in R&D efforts. In principle, if such an abstract possibility is illegal, this is tantamount to recognizing that the NAP provisions are in themselves illegal.
Decision by hearing examiners
This hearing is to examine whether the NAP provisions would violate the Antimonopoly Act and does not make decisions concerning the legality of the NAP provisions. For this reason, the arguments made by MS are inappropriate.
Applicability
The NAP provisions generally suggest that if MS may use OEM technologies, it is assumed to employ a large quantity of OEM technologies. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of OEM suppliers, a quality gap may erode the profits of a high-quality OEM supplier;
incentives for investment may also be compromised with a cost gap between the efficient and inefficient firms. In other words, if we discuss the contracts containing these provisions in relation to the Antimonopoly Act, and OEM suppliers have a technology gap, then it is necessary to pay due attention to the possibility that the NAP provisions erode the profits of efficient OEM suppliers or interfere with OEM suppliers' incentives to invest. This is also related to OEM suppliers' viewpoints expressed in the JFTC decision.
The JFTC decision (taken from the hearing examiners' judgment, page 114, JFTC Decisions) As recognized in 3(1)A above, because the NAP provisions will be applicable in the future, they will apply to licensed products as well as future products and will be in effect for a very long time. In addition, should clarify possible problems in competition policies, because these problems might damage the profits of efficient OEM suppliers or remove their incentive to invest. On the other hand, our analysis also reveals that quantification of these impacts requires careful review.
It may be necessary to examine how to respond to the dominant position of MS in the market, although this paper does not cover such a topic. The JFTC decision argues that MS has a problem because it "keeps using" NAP provisions despite having achieved dominance in the market. The decision also indicates that it is a problem that a dominant supplier uses NAP provisions and that the network effect would serve to further enhance MS' dominant status. Antimonopoly Act experts often state that it is no problem, from the viewpoint of the Antimonopoly Act, for new entrants to adopt such an approach because it encourages competition, but it becomes a problem if it is used by a supplier with dominant status. 
